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With President Reagan’s formal apology and reparation 
payments in 1988 to Japanese-Americans who were interned 
during World War II,1 many felt that a troublesome chapter in 
 
 *  J.D. Candidate 2007, Chapman University School of Law; B.A. 2003, University of 
California, Berkeley.  I would like to thank Professor Celestine McConville for her invalu-
able comments on drafts of this comment.  This comment is dedicated to my father and 
mother, Dr. Mohammad R. Safarzadeh and Simin Badeii, who made immeasurable sacri-
fices for their children's education. 
 1 Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b-4 (2000). 
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United States history had closed.  After Pearl Harbor was at-
tacked on December 7, 1941, approximately 120,000 American 
citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry were evacuated from 
their homes on the West Coast.2  They were gathered at assembly 
centers and relocated to internment camps throughout the coun-
try.3  The internment of Japanese-Americans was immediately 
condemned by legal scholars as “the worst blow our liberties have 
sustained in many years.”4  Although internment was a drastic 
measure, many believed that it was an anomalous response to a 
catastrophic attack that could not happen again. 
The events of September 11, 2001 shattered the sense of se-
curity that Americans had enjoyed for several decades.  For the 
first time since Pearl Harbor was invaded sixty years earlier, 
there was an attack on American soil that cost thousands of lives.  
President Bush and Congress reacted to the attacks with swift 
military action5 and new domestic security laws.6  In the ensuing 
years, several lawsuits challenged the constitutionality of those 
measures before the Supreme Court.7 
Historically, the Supreme Court has responded to the Presi-
dent’s wartime actions in two ways.  At times, the Court has used 
a deferential balancing model to weigh the President’s assertion 
of wartime necessity against the protection of civil liberties.8  
Under this model, the Court interprets constitutional principles 
broadly to allow presidential actions during wartime that it 
would find unconstitutional in peacetime.9  The Court limits the 
role of judicial review by refusing to examine the reasonableness 
of the President’s actions.10  Advocates of the deferential balanc-
ing model argue that the Court should not interfere with the 
President’s protection of national security during temporary war-
time periods.11  However, critics of the model assert that the 
 
 2 TETSUDEN KASHIMA, JUDGMENT WITHOUT TRIAL: JAPANESE AMERICAN 
IMPRISONMENT DURING WORLD WAR II, at 4 (2003). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 
490 (1945). 
 5 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001). 
 6 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (2001). 
 7 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2650 (2004). 
 8 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944). 
 9 Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Con-
stitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1059 (2003).  Gross calls this model “interpretive ac-
commodation.” 
 10 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“In adjudging the military 
action taken . . . it is necessary only that the action have some reasonable relation to the 
removal of the dangers of invasion, sabotage and espionage.”). 
 11 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
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Court’s failure to scrutinize presidential policies has allowed 
policies based on animosity toward unpopular groups to be justi-
fied as national security measures.12 
At other times, the Court has responded to the President’s 
wartime actions by invoking justiciability doctrines to avoid ad-
dressing the merits of a particular issue until the emergency has 
subsided.13  Under the justiciability doctrines model, the Court 
applies procedural grounds like the political question doctrine 
and standing to avoid establishing a precedent that would con-
done constitutional violations.14  Supporters of the justiciability 
doctrines model argue that the Court should not demand that 
military policies conform to constitutional principles when they 
are needed to protect the country.15  Some measures essential to 
winning a war may be unconstitutional.16  Those supporters be-
 
605, 627 (2003). 
 12 Rostow, supra note 4, at 491.  Rostow states that in Korematsu, the Court “upheld 
an act of military power without a factual record in which the justification for the act was 
analyzed.”  Id.  See also Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 239–40 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“A mili-
tary judgment based upon such racial and sociological considerations is not entitled to the 
great weight ordinarily given the judgments based upon strictly military considera-
tions.”). 
 13 See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 14 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 11, at 606 n.1. 
 15 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 244–45 (Jackson, J., dissenting).  Justice Jackson explains 
the justification for the justiciability doctrines model as follows: 
  It would be impracticable and dangerous idealism to expect or insist that 
each specific military command in an area of probable operations will conform 
to conventional tests of constitutionality.  When an area is so beset that it must 
be put under military control at all, the paramount consideration is that its 
measures be successful, rather than legal.  The armed services must protect a 
society, not merely its Constitution. . . . No court can require such a com-
mander in such circumstances to act as a reasonable man; he may be unrea-
sonably cautious and exacting. . . .  
  . . . .  
  In the very nature of things, military decisions are not susceptible of intel-
ligent judicial appraisal.  They do not pretend to rest on evidence, but are made 
on information that often would not be admissible and on assumptions that 
could not be proved. . . .  Hence courts can never have any real alternative to 
accepting the mere declaration of the authority that issued the order that it 
was reasonably necessary from a military viewpoint. 
Id. 
 16 Id. at 245–46.  Jackson argues that the internment of Japanese-Americans is a 
violation of civil liberties.  However, the Court’s decision upholding the internment under 
the Constitution was much worse than the internment order itself: 
  Much is said of the danger to liberty from the Army program for deporting 
and detaining these citizens of Japanese extraction.  But a judicial construction 
of the due process clause that will sustain this order is a far more subtle blow 
to liberty than the promulgation of the order itself.  A military order, however 
unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the military emergency. . . .  But 
once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to 
the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Con-
stitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the prin-
ciple of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting 
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lieve that the Court should not exercise judicial review to vali-
date a policy that is necessary, but clearly unconstitutional.17  
However, critics of the justiciability doctrines model argue that 
by failing to hear cases during wartime, the Court avoids its con-
stitutionally-mandated duty to protect citizens’ rights.18 
The major problem with both models, however, is that they 
are inconsistent with the Founding Fathers’ beliefs.19  The Fram-
ers passionately believed that the President and Congress could 
not ignore constitutional principles.20  They established a Su-
preme Court with a constitutionally-mandated duty to prevent 
oppressive government actions passed in times of war and hys-
teria.21  The Founders believed that a plea of military necessity 
should not be used to violate fundamental constitutional rights.22 
Counterbalancing the Founders’ strict adherence to protect-
ing constitutional rights was their belief that national security 
was extremely important.23  The Court has often failed to take 
this into account by inflexibly interpreting the Constitution.24  
The Founding Fathers believed that the President should have 
sufficient power to protect the nation against foreign attacks,25 
but the Court’s unduly restrictive interpretation can prevent the 
President from defending against sudden attacks.26  During im-
 
American citizens.  The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready 
for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an ur-
gent need. 
Id. 
 17 Id. at 244–46. 
 18 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961) (“[T]he courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Con-
stitution against legislative encroachments . . . .”). 
 19 Id. at 470 (“Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled 
or changed the established form, [the Constitution] is binding upon themselves collec-
tively, as well as individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge of their senti-
ments, can warrant their representatives in a departure from it prior to such an act.”). 
 20 Id. 
 21 See id. (“[I]t is easy to see that it would require an uncommon portion of fortitude 
in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution, where legislative 
invasions of it had been instigated by the major voice of the community.”). 
 22 See id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 69–70. 
 23 THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison), supra note 18, at 256 (“Security against 
foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society.  It is an avowed and essential 
object of the American Union.”). 
 24 See, e.g., Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148–50 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) 
(holding that even in times of war, the President does not have the power to suspend the 
writ of habeas corpus). 
 25 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 423 (“Energy in 
the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.  It is essential to 
the protection of the community against foreign attacks.”). 
 26 See, e.g., Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 149.  Justice Taney inflexibly interprets the 
Constitution during the Civil War.  In response to imminent danger that Confederate 
forces would invade Washington, D.C., President Lincoln ordered General Cadwalader to 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus.  He did not get permission from Congress before doing 
so.  In Merryman, Justice Taney harshly criticized President Lincoln for unilaterally sus-
501-530 SAFARZADEH.DOC 5/30/2007 10:29:53 PM 
2006] Toward a Balancing Test with Bite 505 
minent threats to national security, constitutional principles 
must be tempered by the President’s need to protect the nation. 
This comment advocates the balancing test with bite model, 
which the Court adopted in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.27  This model is 
most consistent with the Founding Fathers’ views because it pro-
vides all three branches with important roles during wartime.28  
The Court in Hamdi exercised its constitutionally-mandated duty 
to judicially review the President’s wartime actions.29  It also 
demanded evidence to support a citizen’s detention,30 while ac-
commodating the military’s needs by lowering its evidentiary 
burden.31  At the same time, however, the Court balanced its pro-
tection of citizens’ rights with the President’s interest in conduct-
ing the war by reaffirming the holding in Ex parte Quirin, which 
allows the President to detain even American citizens designated 
as enemy combatants.32 
Part I of this comment explores how the Supreme Court his-
torically has responded to the President’s wartime actions.  Part 
II explains the Founding Fathers’ belief in constitutional absolut-
ism and the Supreme Court’s duty to protect citizens’ rights.  
Part III argues that the Court has applied constitutional absolut-
ism inconsistently with the Founders’ wishes by unduly burden-
ing the President’s power to protect national security during war-
time.  Part IV advocates the balancing test with bite model and 
shows that it is most effective at simultaneously defending na-
tional security and protecting constitutional rights. 
 
pending the writ of habeas corpus: 
  With such provisions in the constitution, expressed in language too clear to 
be misunderstood by any one, I can see no ground whatever for supposing that 
the president, in any emergency, or in any state of things, can authorize the 
suspension of the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or the arrest of a citi-
zen, except in aid of the judicial power. 
Id.  
 27 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2647–48 (2004) (holding that an individual 
detainee’s interest in due process must be balanced against the government’s interest in 
protecting national security). 
 28 Id. at 2650 (“Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Ex-
ecutive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of con-
flict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are 
at stake.”). 
 29 Id. (“We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the 
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”). 
 30 Id. at 2651 (“Any process in which the Executive’s factual assertions go wholly un-
challenged or are simply presumed correct without any opportunity for the alleged com-
batant to demonstrate otherwise falls constitutionally short.”). 
 31 Id. at 2649 (“[E]nemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their 
uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.”). 
 32 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942). 
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I.  THE SUPREME COURT’S WARTIME RESPONSES TO  
PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS 
Historically, the Supreme Court has responded to the Presi-
dent’s wartime actions by following one of two models: the defer-
ential balancing model33 or the justiciability doctrines model.34  
Under the deferential balancing model, the Court examines the 
reasonableness of the President’s actions in a highly deferential 
manner, allowing infringement of citizens’ rights.35  Likewise, 
under the justiciability doctrines model, the Court avoids review-
ing presidential actions so that a harmful judicial precedent is 
not established.36  Both models severely restrict the wartime role 
of judicial review in protecting citizens’ constitutional rights.37 
A. The Deferential Balancing Model 
Under the deferential balancing model, the Supreme Court 
defers to the President’s determination that his policies strike 
the proper balance between defending national security and pro-
tecting civil liberties during wartime.38  Constitutional rights 
normally provided during peacetime are outweighed by the 
President’s need to conduct the war effort.39  Scholars who defend 
the deferential balancing model argue that the Court’s defense of 
constitutional rights during wartime will unduly burden the 
 
 33 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944) (“[W]e cannot re-
ject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that there 
were disloyal members of that population, whose number and strength could not be pre-
cisely and quickly ascertained.” (quoting Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 
(1943))). 
 34 See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943) (“Since the sen-
tences of three months each imposed by the district court on the two counts were ordered 
to run concurrently, it will be unnecessary to consider questions raised with respect to the 
first count if we find that the conviction on the second count, for violation of the curfew 
order, must be sustained.”). 
 35 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“[N]o reasonable relation to 
an ‘immediate, imminent, and impending’ public danger is evident to support this racial 
restriction which is one of the most sweeping and complete deprivations of constitutional 
rights in the history of this nation . . . .” (quoting United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 623, 628 (1872))). 
 36 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85. 
 37 This is particularly problematic because an independent judiciary was specifically 
intended to protect the constitutional rights of individuals without being swayed by popu-
lar opinion.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 469 
(“This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the 
rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing men, 
or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people 
themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more 
deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innova-
tions in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.”). 
 38 See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218. 
 39 Gross, supra note 9, at 1034 (“Judges . . . are sensitive to the criticism that they 
impede the war effort.  Thus, in states of emergency, national courts assume a highly def-
erential attitude when called upon to review governmental actions and decisions.”). 
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President’s protection of national security.40  However, critics of 
the model argue that the Court should review the reasonableness 
of the President’s actions without such deference to determine 
whether the cost of infringing citizens’ rights outweighs national 
security objectives.41 
The Court adopted the deferential balancing model in Kore-
matsu v. United States42 in response to President Roosevelt’s Ex-
ecutive Order 9066, which authorized General J.L. DeWitt to in-
tern Japanese-Americans during World War II.43  After President 
Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, General DeWitt issued 
Public Proclamation No. 1, which designated security areas from 
which Japanese residents should be removed.44  In Korematsu, 
the Court upheld the internment order, reasoning that “we can-
not reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities 
and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that popula-
tion, whose number and strength could not be precisely and 
quickly ascertained.”45  Although no Japanese resident was ever 
charged with espionage,46 the Court refused to examine the rea-
sons behind General DeWitt’s internment order.47  The Court de-
termined that the President’s national security measures out-
weighed citizens’ due process rights.48 
Scholars who defend the deferential balancing model argue 
that vigorous judicial review during wartime unduly burdens the 
President’s defense of national security.49  They observe that 
“[t]he characteristics of judicial review—deliberation, openness, 
independence, distance, slowness—may be minor costs, and 
sometimes virtues, during normal times; but during emergencies 
 
 40 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 11, at 627 (“The characteristics of judicial re-
view—deliberation, openness, independence, distance, slowness—may be minor costs, and 
sometimes virtues, during normal times; but during emergencies they can be intoler-
able.”). 
 41 See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting).  Justice Murphy 
applies no such deference in his dissent, stating, “In adjudging the military action . . . it is 
necessary only that the action have some reasonable relation to the removal of the dan-
gers of invasion, sabotage and espionage.  But the exclusion . . . of all persons with Japa-
nese blood . . . has no such reasonable relation.”  Id. 
 42 Id. at 217–19. 
 43 Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092–93 (1942). 
 44 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 86 (1943). 
 45 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (quoting Hirabayshi v. United States, 323 U.S. 81, 99 
(1943)). 
 46 Sharon Boswell & Lorraine McConaghy, Abundant Dreams Diverted, SEATTLE 
DAILY TIMES, June 23, 1996, at B2. 
 47 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that no reason-
able relation existed between the exclusion order and the removal of danger). 
 48 Id. at 219–20 (majority opinion) (“Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens 
from their homes . . . is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions.  But 
when . . . our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be com-
mensurate with the threatened danger.”). 
 49 See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 11, at 627. 
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they can be intolerable.”50  The Court’s examination of wartime 
actions can interfere with military operations in foreign countries 
by requiring soldiers to gather evidence about detainees.51  Fur-
thermore, the openness of court proceedings may allow national 
security secrets that could harm the military to be released.52  
Military officials should be given wide latitude to protect national 
security during wartime without judicial intervention.53 
Advocates of the deferential balancing model also argue that 
the temporary hardships of war justify policies that should not be 
permitted during peacetime.54  As Justice Frankfurter observed 
in his concurring opinion in Korematsu, “action is not to be stig-
matized as lawless because like action in times of peace would be 
lawless.”55  Constitutional principles should be somewhat relaxed 
during a temporary wartime emergency.56  Scholars have noted 
that “[a]lthough deference also permits the executive to violate 
rights, violations that are intolerable during normal times be-
come tolerable when the stakes are higher.”57  The President’s 
protection against imminent attacks may be unduly restricted by 
a court that rigidly interprets the Constitution without regard to 
legitimate national security concerns.58 
Critics of the deferential balancing model respond that by re-
fusing to examine the President’s policies, the Court allows citi-
zens’ constitutional rights to be violated for reasons unrelated to 
national security.59  In Korematsu, for example, the Court ig-
 
 50 Id. 
 51 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 470 (2003) (“The military has been charged by 
Congress and the executive with winning a war, not prevailing in a possible court case.”), 
vacated, 542 U.S. 507. 
 52 John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
427, 448 (2003) (“A habeas proceeding could become the forum for recalling commanders 
and intelligence operatives from the field into open court; disrupting overt and covert op-
erations; revealing successful military tactics and methods; and forcing the military to 
shape its activities to the demands of the judicial process.”). 
 53 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 474 (“Article III courts are ill-positioned to police the mili-
tary’s distinction between those in the arena of combat who should be detained and those 
who should not.”). 
 54 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Gross, supra note 9, at 1059 (“[T]he need for additional powers to fend off a dan-
gerous threat is accommodated by an expansive, emergency-minded interpretive spin on 
existing norms through which various components of the ordinary legal system are trans-
formed into counter-emergency facilitating norms.”). 
 57 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 11, at 609. 
 58 Gross, supra note 9, at 1044 (“When faced with serious threats to the life of the 
nation, government will take whatever measures it deems necessary to abate the crisis.”). 
 59 See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“[N]o reasonable 
relation to an ‘immediate, imminent, and impending’ public danger is evident to support 
this racial restriction which is one of the most sweeping and complete deprivations of con-
stitutional rights in the history of this nation . . . .” (quoting United States v. Russell, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) 623, 628 (1872))). 
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nored the fact that General DeWitt, the military commander who 
ordered the internment of Japanese residents from the West 
Coast, had animosity toward the Japanese.60  As Justice Murphy 
observed in his dissenting opinion in Korematsu, General DeWitt 
testified before Congress that “I don’t want any of them [persons 
of Japanese ancestry] here. . . .  It makes no difference whether 
he is an American citizen, he is still a Japanese. . . .  [W]e must 
worry about the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the 
map.”61 
The Court’s failure to consider General DeWitt’s reasons for 
the internment order allowed a policy motivated by hostility to-
ward a racial group to be disguised as a national security meas-
ure.62  As Justice Murphy observed, “A military judgment based 
upon such racial and sociological considerations is not entitled to 
the great weight ordinarily given the judgments based upon 
strictly military considerations.”63  During wartime, where a ra-
cial or politically unpopular group is often targeted, the Court 
should be especially vigilant in protecting civil liberties.64 
B. The Justiciability Doctrines Model 
Under the justiciability doctrines model, the Court prevents 
the establishment of a judicial precedent sanctioning constitu-
tional violations by failing to address the merits of a case or an 
issue.65  The Court uses the doctrines of standing and political 
question to avoid reviewing the constitutionality of the Presi-
dent’s policies.66  By refusing to hear a case, the Court does not 
interfere with the military’s prosecution of a war and does not 
constitutionally challenge the President’s policies.67 
 
 60 Id. at 236 n.2. 
 61 Id. 
 62 CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 50 (ex-
panded ed. 1976) (Justice Murphy “had apparently bothered to read the military and con-
gressional reports on the evacuation, and had been shocked by the evidences of naked 
prejudice that ran like angry veins of poison through its entire history.”). 
 63 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 239–40 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 64 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 672 (2d 
ed. 2002) (“[T]he Constitution and the Court’s role are most important precisely in such 
times when pressure and even hysteria to violate rights and discriminate will be most 
likely to occur.”). 
 65 See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“A military com-
mander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident.  But if we re-
view and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution.”). 
 66 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 11, at 606 n.1 (“[T]he expansion of executive 
power is accepted but not explicitly acknowledged, and courts . . . do and should exercise 
deference surreptitiously, by ducking legal challenges with the help of the copious proce-
dural mechanisms at their disposal—standing doctrine, denial of certiorari, delay, and so 
forth.”). 
 67 Id. 
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The Court applied the justiciability doctrines model in Hira-
bayashi v. United States, a case challenging both the curfew and 
internment orders against Japanese-Americans during World 
War II.68  Gordon Hirabayashi was charged with violating the in-
ternment order and failing to comply with the curfew order.69  
The district court ordered him to serve a concurrent sentence of 
three months for both counts.70  The Court used the concurrent 
sentence doctrine to avoid deciding the constitutionality of the in-
ternment order.71  Under this doctrine, if an appellate court can 
affirm a conviction on one count, it does not need to hear a chal-
lenge to a second count if the second count’s sentence is equal to 
or less than the first count.72  The Supreme Court upheld the cur-
few order and avoided addressing the internment order: 
Since the sentences of three months each imposed by the dis-
trict court on the two counts were ordered to run concurrently, it 
will be unnecessary to consider questions raised with respect to 
the first count if we find that the conviction on the second count, 
for violation of the curfew order, must be sustained.73 
The Court easily upheld the curfew order, as Hirabayashi 
himself admitted that it was a reasonable wartime measure.74  
The Court reasoned that “it is enough that circumstances within 
the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility for main-
taining the national defense afforded a rational basis for the de-
cision which they made.”75  As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed 
in his book on the subject: 
  In Hirabayashi . . . the Court could have decided the validity of 
both the relocation requirement and the curfew requirement.  The 
“concurrent sentence” doctrine under which the Court declined to do 
so is not mandatory but discretionary.  But counseling against any 
broader decision was the well-established rule that the Court should 
avoid deciding constitutional questions if it is possible to do so.76 
By using the concurrent sentence doctrine, the Court in Hir-
abayashi avoided review of the controversial internment order.77  
 
 68 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943). 
 69 Id. at 83. 
 70 Id. at 85. 
 71 See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 
205 (1998). 
 72 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 310 (8th ed. 2004). 
 73 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85. 
 74 Id. at 99. 
 75 Id. at 102. 
 76 REHNQUIST, supra note 71, at 205. 
 77 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85 (“Since the sentences of three months each imposed 
by the district court on the two counts were ordered to run concurrently, it will be unnec-
essary to consider questions raised with respect to the first count if we find that the con-
viction on the second count, for violation of the curfew order, must be sustained.”). 
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The curfew order requiring citizens to remain in their homes af-
ter 8:00 p.m. was a much lighter restriction on civil rights than 
the internment order forcing citizens to be removed from their 
homes, sell their personal belongings, and relocate to internment 
camps.78  The Court avoided establishing a legal precedent that 
validated the internment order until a year and a half later in 
Korematsu.79 
In Korematsu, Justice Jackson defended the justiciability 
doctrines model in his dissenting opinion.80  Although Jackson 
observed that the internment order singling out Japanese resi-
dents was both over-inclusive and under-inclusive, he reluctantly 
noted that it is more important that military measures be suc-
cessful than legal.81  He then presented the rationale for the jus-
ticiability doctrines model: 
  [C]ourts can never have any real alternative to accepting the mere 
declaration of the authority that issued the order that it was reasona-
bly necessary from a military viewpoint. . . . A military commander 
may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident.  
But if we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doc-
trine of the Constitution.82 
Justice Jackson argued that military decisions should not be 
subject to judicial standards that might sacrifice the war effort.83  
The military emergency of the time may warrant drastic, legally 
questionable actions by the President.84  A judicial precedent ap-
proving such policies, however, could be used in times that do not 
warrant such action.85  Thus, the Court should refuse to hear 
challenges to the President’s policies to prevent the establish-
ment of a harmful judicial precedent.86 
Scholars have asserted two major critiques of the justiciabil-
 
 78 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225–26 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) 
(“This is not a case of keeping people off the streets at night as was Hirabayashi . . . . it is 
[a] case of convicting a citizen as a punishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a 
concentration camp.”). 
 79 Id. at 219. 
 80 Id. at 242 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 81 Id. at 244. 
 82 Id. at 245–46. 
 83 Id. at 244 (“No court can require such a commander in such circumstances to act 
as a reasonable man; he may be unreasonably cautious and exacting.”). 
 84 Id. at 246 (“A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer 
than the military emergency.”). 
 85 Id. (“But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it con-
forms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Consti-
tution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial 
discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens.  The princi-
ple then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can 
bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”). 
 86 Id. 
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ity doctrines model.  First, critics have challenged Justice Jack-
son’s argument that wartime precedents will be used to sanction 
abuses during normal times.87  They assert: 
  Why must the precedent both (1) spill over into ordinary law and 
(2) remain entrenched ‘for all time,’ as Jackson puts it?  As for the 
first condition, the precedent will itself have a built-in limitation to 
emergency circumstances. . . . 
  . . . . 
  As for the second condition, . . . . [s]tare decisis will be either 
strong or weak.  If it is weak, then past precedents granting emer-
gency powers can be overruled . . . .88 
According to these critics, Justice Jackson incorrectly as-
sumes that wartime measures validated by the Court will be 
used during normal times.89  The Court can restrict the prece-
dent’s application to similar wartime emergencies.90  The Court 
can also refuse to extend a precedent to a situation that does not 
warrant similar deference.91 
A second criticism of the justiciability doctrines model is the 
normative argument that the Supreme Court has an affirmative 
duty to prevent constitutional violations.92  As Chief Justice Mar-
shall observed in Marbury v. Madison, “the very essence of civil 
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim 
the protection of the laws.”93  With lifetime tenure and guaran-
teed salaries, federal judges are in a unique position to vindicate 
the constitutional rights of racially and politically unpopular 
groups during times of hysteria.94  The Court’s use of justiciabil-
ity doctrines effectively ignores constitutional violations. 
II.  THE FOUNDING FATHERS’ BELIEFS 
The primary reason that the Court should avoid applying the 
deferential balancing model and the justiciability doctrines model 
is that both models are inconsistent with the Founding Fathers’ 
 
 87 See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 11, at 615–16. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 615 (“[L]ater judges may either distend the precedent to accommodate gov-
ernment power or else contract the precedent to constrain it.”). 
 91 Id. 
 92 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 469. 
 93 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
 94 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 469.  
  If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a lim-
ited Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will af-
ford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since noth-
ing will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges 
which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty. 
Id.  
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beliefs.95  The Framers adopted a written Constitution to estab-
lish certain fundamental rights that are immune from actions by 
the President and Congress.96  They believed that the role of the 
Supreme Court is to protect citizens’ fundamental civil rights 
during both wartime and peacetime.97  The President and mili-
tary officials cannot use a plea of military necessity to violate 
fundamental constitutional rights.98 
A.  The Constitution’s Supremacy over Ordinary Acts 
By creating the Constitution, the Founders intended to es-
tablish certain fundamental rights that a political majority could 
not easily change.99  Unless it is amended, the Constitution’s 
provisions are superior to all contrary presidential and congres-
sional acts.100  Alexander Hamilton declared in The Federalist 
No. 78, “Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative 
act, annulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon 
themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no presump-
tion, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant their 
representatives in a departure from it prior to such an act.”101  
The Founding Fathers worried that a tyrannical majority would 
unite to deprive other citizens of their rights.102  Thus, they pro-
 
 95 Id. at 470 (The Constitution “is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as 
individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant 
their representatives in a departure from it.”). 
 96 Id. 
 97 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120–21 (1866).  The Court in Milligan embraced 
constitutional absolutism: 
  Those great and good men [Founding Fathers] foresaw that troublous 
times would arise, when rules and people would become restive under re-
straint, and seek by sharp and decisive measures to accomplish ends deemed 
just and proper; and that the principles of constitutional liberty would be in 
peril, unless established by irrepealable law. . . . The Constitution of the 
United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and 
covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and un-
der all circumstances.  No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, 
was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be sus-
pended during any of the great exigencies of government.  Such a doctrine 
leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it 
is based is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has all the pow-
ers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence . . . . 
Id. 
 98 Id. at 121, 123. 
 99 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 467 (“No legisla-
tive act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid.”). 
 100 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land . . . .”). 
 101 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 470. 
 102 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 18, at 80 (“When a majority 
is included in a faction, the form of popular government . . . enables it to sacrifice to its 
ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens.”). 
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posed and ratified a written Constitution to grant all citizens ba-
sic protections that cannot be denied by the political branches of 
government.103 
Justice Marshall reaffirmed the Constitution’s supremacy 
over acts of the President and Congress in Marbury v. Madi-
son.104  There, Justice Marshall argued that the theory behind 
written constitutions is to establish certain fundamental, unal-
terable principles: 
The [C]onstitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable 
by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, 
and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to al-
ter it. . . . 
  . . . . 
  [I]f the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd 
attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power, in its own nature 
illimitable. . . . 
  . . . . 
  [I]t thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest im-
provement on political institutions—a written constitution.105 
Justice Marshall argued that measures passed by Congress 
and the President cannot be given the same weight as constitu-
tional provisions.106  The Constitution’s fundamental principles 
must remain superior to the temporary decisions of political ma-
jorities.107 
The Founders feared that leaders could use the fear of for-
eign attacks to deprive citizens of their constitutional rights.108  
In The Federalist No. 8, Alexander Hamilton contrasts countries 
forced to maintain standing armies to defend against frequent 
invasions with those that have small militaries.109  He warns of 
 
 103 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 469 (“[Y]et it is 
not to be inferred from this principle [that the Constitution can be amended] that the rep-
resentatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a 
majority of their constituents incompatible with the provisions in the existing Constitu-
tion would, on that account, be justifiable in a violation of those provisions.”). 
 104 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (observing that the Constitution is the “supreme 
law of the land,” and that only the laws of the United States “made in pursuance of the 
[C]onstitution” are valid). 
 105 Id. at 177–78 (emphasis added). 
 106 Id. at 176–77 (“The distinction, between a government with limited and unlimited 
powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, 
and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation.”). 
 107 Id. at 177 (“[A]n act of the legislature, repugnant to the [C]onstitution, is void.”). 
 108 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 68–69 (noting 
that “[i]t is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative 
authority,” and that “in a country seldom exposed . . . to internal invasions, . . . the people 
are in no danger of being broken to military subordination.  The laws are not accustomed 
to relaxation in favor of military exigencies . . . .”). 
 109 Id. at 69. 
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the consequences of a society where people constantly need mili-
tary protection: 
  The continual necessity for [the military’s] services enhances the 
importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition 
of the citizen. . . .  The inhabitants of territories, often the theater of 
war, are unavoidably subject to frequent infringements on their 
rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights; and by de-
grees the people are brought to consider the soldiery not only as their 
protectors but as their superiors.110 
Hamilton urged Americans to avoid the constant wars that 
plagued Europe and made the military state superior to the civil 
state.111    The Founders realized that the government could use 
wartime hysteria as a pretext to violate citizens’ rights.112  By 
drafting a written Constitution, the Founding Fathers sought to 
prevent leaders from using wars to aggregate their own power at 
the expense of constitutional rights.113 
B. The Duty of Judges to Protect Constitutional Rights 
The Founding Fathers left the protection of the Constitution 
to federal judges, who have the duty to defend citizens’ rights de-
spite political pressure.114  The Founders understood that in 
times of hysteria, politically accountable legislators and executive 
officials cannot protect unpopular constitutional principles.115  
Hamilton argued that “it is easy to see that it would require an 
uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as 
faithful guardians of the Constitution, where legislative inva-
sions of it had been instigated by the major voice of the commu-
nity.”116  Federal judges were given lifetime tenure so that they 
could protect citizens’ rights against oppressive legislation with-
out fearing political pressure.117 
The Founders also envisioned that the Court would chal-
lenge policies that restricted citizens’ rights during times of hys-
 
 110 Id. at 70. 
 111 THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 56. 
 112 THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 67 (“The violent 
destruction of life and property incident to war . . . will compel nations the most attached 
to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy 
their civil and political rights.”). 
 113 THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (John Jay), supra note 18, at 69 (“[I]n a country seldom 
exposed . . . to internal invasions, . . . the people are in no danger of being broken to mili-
tary subordination.  The laws are not accustomed to relaxation in favor of military exigen-
cies . . . .”). 
 114 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 469. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 470. 
 117 Id. at 469. 
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teria.118  They predicted situations where powerful interest 
groups would deceive legislators into passing oppressive meas-
ures: 
  This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the 
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill 
humors which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular 
conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, 
and which, though they speedily give place to better information, and 
more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occa-
sion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppres-
sions of the minor party in the community.119 
The scenario Hamilton describes is strikingly similar to 
Japanese-American internment during World War II, where 
farmers competing with the Japanese fiercely lobbied Congress to 
support the internment order.120  As Justice Murphy observed in 
his Korematsu dissent, competing farmers had admitted that “[i]f 
all the Japs were removed tomorrow, we’d never miss them in 
two weeks, because the white farmers can take over and produce 
everything the Jap grows.”121  The Founding Fathers realized 
that politically accountable legislators and the President could 
not defend unpopular groups’ constitutional rights against in-
tense political pressure.122  They trusted independent, lifetime-
tenured judges to protect all citizens’ constitutional rights.123  
III.  THE IMPRACTICALITY OF RIGIDLY INTERPRETING THE 
CONSTITUTION 
Although the Founding Fathers believed that constitutional 
rights should not be violated during wartime, they also wanted 
the President to have sufficient power to protect national secu-
rity.124  The Court can interpret the Constitution flexibly without 
violating it to give the President sufficient power to defend the 
country.  By refusing to accommodate civil liberties to wartime 
necessities, the Court does not give the President sufficient 
power to defend the country.  The Founding Fathers believed 
 
 118 Id.  
 119 Id. at 469. 
 120 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 239 n.12 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissent-
ing). 
 121 Id. at 239 n.12 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 122 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 469–70. 
 123 Id. at 470–71 (“That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Consti-
tution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice, 
can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary commis-
sion.”). 
 124 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 423 (“Energy in 
the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.  It is essential to 
the protection of the community against foreign attacks . . . .”). 
501-530 SAFARZADEH.DOC 5/30/2007 10:29:53 PM 
2006] Toward a Balancing Test with Bite 517 
that an important government objective was defending the na-
tion against military attacks.125  While protecting constitutional 
rights, the Court can still allow the President enough power to 
defend national security.126 
The Founding Fathers believed that the President should 
have sufficient power to protect the country against foreign at-
tacks.127  The Founders worried that a weak President would be 
ineffective at quickly responding to national security dangers.128  
As Hamilton observed, “[e]nergy in the executive is a leading 
character in the definition of good government. . . . [and] is essen-
tial to the protection of the community against foreign at-
tacks.”129  During wars, the President should not be unduly re-
stricted from acting decisively in conducting military 
operations.130   
Contrary to the Founders’ belief in presidential strength dur-
ing wartime, the Court has sometimes rigidly interpreted the 
Constitution in a manner that frustrates important military 
measures.  During the Civil War, for example, Justice Taney in 
Ex parte Merryman refused to accommodate the President’s war 
effort by compromising constitutional principles.131  John Merry-
man, a citizen residing in Baltimore, Maryland, was arrested for 
aiding the Confederacy during the Civil War.132  He petitioned for 
a writ of habeas corpus, but the military commander refused to 
honor it, arguing that he was authorized to suspend the writ by 
President Lincoln.133  In Merryman, Justice Taney rejected 
President Lincoln’s authority to suspend the writ of habeas cor-
pus without congressional approval: 
  With such provisions in the constitution, expressed in language 
too clear to be misunderstood by any one, I can see no ground what-
 
 125 THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay), supra note 18, at 42.  
  Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary 
to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the 
first. . . .   
  At present I mean only to consider [safety] as it respects security for the 
preservation of peace and tranquility, as well as against dangers from foreign 
arms and influence.   
Id.  See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 423. 
 126 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2649–50 (2004) (“[I]t does not in-
fringe on the core role of the military for the courts to exercise their own time-honored 
and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolving claims like those pre-
sented here.”). 
 127 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 423. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 See, e.g., Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). 
 132 ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 20–21. 
 133 Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 148. 
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ever for supposing that the [P]resident, in any emergency, or in any 
state of things, can authorize the suspension of the privileges of the 
writ of habeas corpus, or the arrest of a citizen, except in aid of the ju-
dicial power.134 
Justice Taney argued that only Congress can suspend the 
writ of habeas corpus because the power to suspend it is found in 
Article I of the Constitution, which lists Congress’s powers.135  He 
also cited Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Ex parte Bollman 
that “[i]f at any time, the public safety should require the sus-
pension of the . . . [writ of habeas corpus], it is for the legislature 
to say so.”136  Justice Taney believed that the President could not 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus under any circumstances.137 
Contrary to Justice Taney’s uncompromising opinion in Mer-
ryman, some scholars argue that the President has the constitu-
tional power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus to defend 
against a sudden attack.138  If Congress is not in session, the 
President may need to act quickly to challenge an imminent na-
tional security danger.  As Professor William F. Duker has ob-
served, “Taney’s analysis was faulty in failing to acknowledge a 
presidential power to suspend where essential to repel sudden 
invasion.”139  Other scholars argue that during the Civil War, it 
was debatable whether the President or Congress should sus-
pend the writ of habeas corpus in emergencies.140  They contend 
that President Lincoln should not be criticized for suspending the 
writ of habeas corpus and for failing to honor John Merryman’s 
habeas petition because Lincoln’s constitutional duty as Com-
mander in Chief to protect the nation from an imminent invasion 
outweighed the debatable procedural rule that only Congress 
could suspend the writ of habeas corpus.141 
 
 134 Id. at 149. 
 135 Id. at 148 (“The clause of the constitution, which authorizes the suspension of the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, is in the 9th section of the first article.  This com-
ment is devoted to the legislative department of the United States, and has not the slight-
est reference to the executive department.”). 
 136 Id. at 152 (quoting Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807)). 
 137 Id. at 149 (“I can see no ground whatever for supposing that the president, in any 
emergency, or in any state of things, can authorize the suspension of the privileges of the 
writ of habeas corpus . . . .”). 
 138 WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 147–48 
(1980). 
 139 Id. 
 140 ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 25 (“It would seem equally futile to argue over the 
present location of this power, for it is a question on which fact and theory cannot be ex-
pected to concur.”). 
 141 Eli Palomares, Illegal Confinement: Presidential Authority to Suspend the Privi-
lege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus During Times of Emergency, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
101, 119.  The author writes: “An argument can be made that Lincoln’s first suspension of 
the writ was legally justified under the President’s implied power to repel sudden at-
tacks.”  Id. at 118. 
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Justice Taney unrealistically believed that the Constitution’s 
provisions should not be interpreted flexibly during hardships 
faced by the nation.142  As noted by Clinton Rossiter, Taney “con-
sidered himself the last barricade between the Constitution and 
despotism.”143  After stating that he was sending a sealed copy of 
his opinion to President Lincoln, Justice Taney then solemnly ob-
served, “It will then remain for that high officer, in fulfillment of 
his constitutional obligation to ‘take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed,’ to determine what measures he will take to cause 
the civil process of the United States to be respected and en-
forced.”144 
President Lincoln responded to Justice Taney by admitting 
that he had an oath to act constitutionally, but argued that the 
military danger justified his actions.145  In a speech before Con-
gress on July 4, 1861, President Lincoln agreed with Taney that 
“the attention of the country has been called to the proposition 
that one who is sworn to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed should not himself violate them.”146  However, he de-
fended his actions as essential to protecting the Union at a time 
of threatened invasion: “[A]re all the laws but one to go unexe-
cuted, and the Government itself to go to pieces, lest that one be 
violated?”147  President Lincoln felt that he was required to sus-
pend the writ of habeas corpus without waiting for Congress be-
cause an imminent invasion by Confederate forces threatened 
the nation, and he had a constitutional duty to protect the coun-
try.148 
 
 142 Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 149.  
Nor can any argument be drawn from the nature of sovereignty, or the neces-
sity of government, for self-defence in times of tumult and danger.  The gov-
ernment of the United States is one of delegated and limited powers; it derives 
its existence and authority altogether from the constitution, and neither of its 
branches, executive, legislative or judicial, can exercise any of the powers of 
government beyond those specified and granted . . . . 
Id.  
 143 ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 22. 
 144 Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 153. 
 145 ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 24. 
 146 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 147 Gross, supra note 9, at 1015 (alteration in original). 
 148 ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 25 (“The law of the Constitution, as it actually exists, 
must be considered to read that in a condition of martial necessity the President has the 
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.”).  See also Ex parte Val-
landigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864).  After President Lincoln refused to comply with 
Justice Taney’s ruling in Ex parte Merryman, the Court was unsuccessful in protecting 
even basic civil liberties during the Civil War.  In Ex parte Vallandigham, Clement L. 
Vallandigham was arrested for announcing to a crowd that he believed “that the present 
war was a wicked, cruel, and unnecessary war, one not waged for the preservation of the 
Union, but for the purposes of crushing out liberty and to erect a despotism . . . .”  Id. at 
244.  He was arrested, charged with sympathizing with the Confederacy, and sentenced to 
confinement for the duration of the war.  The Supreme Court refused to hear the merits of 
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IV.  THE BALANCING TEST WITH BITE MODEL 
This comment advocates the balancing test with bite model, 
which the Court adopted in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.149  The balancing 
test with bite model is most consistent with the Founding Fa-
thers’ wishes because it secures essential roles for all three 
branches of government during wartime.150  Unlike the deferen-
tial balancing model and the justiciability doctrines model, which 
deferred to the President’s decisions with little scrutiny, the 
Court in Hamdi recognized its constitutionally-mandated duty to 
review presidential actions that threaten to deprive citizens of 
their rights.151  The Court rejected the argument that exercising 
judicial review will necessarily interfere with the military’s war 
effort.152  Further, the Court demanded concrete evidence from 
the President to support his detention of United States citi-
zens,153 but accommodated the military’s wartime needs by low-
ering its evidentiary burden.154  However, in addition to protect-
ing civil rights as mentioned above, the Court also validated the 
holding in Ex parte Quirin, which gave the President extensive 
power to conduct the war by detaining even American citizens 
designated as enemy combatants.155  In doing so, it achieved a 
critical balance between civil rights and presidential war powers. 
A. The Court’s Recognition of Its Duty to Protect Rights 
By recognizing its duty to protect constitutional rights, the 
Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld complied with the Founders’ de-
mand that all three branches of government have active roles at 
all times.156  The Supreme Court refused to defer to the military 
commanders’ designation of enemy combatant status without in-
 
Vallandigham’s case, explaining that it lacked jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act of 
1789 to originate a writ of certiorari to review the proceedings of a military commission.  
Id. at 251–52. 
 149 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2647 (2004). 
 150 Id. at 2650 (“Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Ex-
ecutive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of con-
flict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are 
at stake.”). 
 151 Id. (“We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the 
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”). 
 152 Id. at 2649 (“[I]t does not infringe on the core role of the military for the courts to 
exercise their own time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and 
resolving claims like those presented here.”). 
 153 Id. at 2651 (“Any process in which the Executive’s factual assertions go wholly un-
challenged or are simply presumed correct without any opportunity for the alleged com-
batant to demonstrate otherwise falls constitutionally short.”). 
 154 Id. at 2649 (“[E]nemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their 
uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.”). 
 155 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942). 
 156 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2650 (2004). 
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specting its reasonableness.157  The Court observed that a true 
balancing test must preserve a role for the Court’s protection of 
civil liberties: “Whatever power the United States Constitution 
envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or 
with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly 
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties 
are at stake.”158 
Like the Founding Fathers, who believed that judges should 
protect constitutional rights against government infringements 
in times of war and hysteria, the Court recognized its duty to re-
view the constitutionality of wartime policies.159 
The Court rejected the reasoning in Hirabayashi v. United 
States that challenging military decisions would compromise the 
war effort.160  In Hirabayshi, the Court observed: 
  Where, as they did here, the conditions call for the exercise of 
judgment and discretion and for the choice of means by those 
branches of the Government on which the Constitution has placed the 
responsibility of war-making, it is not for any court to sit in review of 
the wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment for theirs.161 
The Court in Hirabayashi assumed that providing hearings 
for 70,000 Japanese-American citizens to prove their loyalty 
would be unduly time-consuming and administratively burden-
some.162  However, England showed that administering due proc-
ess proceedings for residents was not too difficult.163  As Clinton 
Rossiter observes, “the English in 1940 had examined 74,000 en-
emy aliens individually . . . [while] Americans in 1942 had de-
clined to make any attempt to separate the loyal from the dis-
loyal in the Japanese-American population.”164  Mere 
administrative inconvenience is not a valid reason for the gov-
ernment to violate citizens’ fundamental constitutional rights.165 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld shows that courts still fear that their exercise of judi-
cial review will harm the military’s efforts.166  Arguing that 
 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943). 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 99 (“[W]e cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authori-
ties and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose number 
and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained.”). 
 163 ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 50–51. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) 
(“Any inconvenience that may have accompanied an attempt to conform to procedural due 
process cannot be said to justify violations of constitutional rights of individuals.”). 
 166 [Hamdi I], 316 F.3d 450, 471 (4th Cir. 2003). 
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Hamdi’s detention should be upheld under a “some evidence” 
standard, the government presented an affidavit from Michael 
Mobbs, the Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy, as evidence of Hamdi’s affiliation with the Taliban.167  The 
district court “criticized the generic and hearsay nature of the af-
fidavit, calling it ‘little more than the government’s “say-so.”’”168  
However, the Fourth Circuit accepted the Mobbs declaration as 
sufficient evidence. The Fourth Circuit stated: “For the judicial 
branch to trespass upon the exercise of the warmaking powers 
would be an infringement of the right to self-determination and 
self-governance at a time when the care of the common defense is 
most critical.”169 
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that reviewing the govern-
ment’s allegations would unduly burden the military.170  The 
court argued that the military would compromise its wartime ob-
jectives by having to collect evidence to prove enemy combatant 
status.171  Furthermore, it argued that courts would have diffi-
culty judging the accuracy of military procedures in distant bat-
tle zones.172 
B. The Court’s Modification of Evidentiary Requirements 
In addition to recognizing its duty to protect constitutional 
rights, the Court in Hamdi demanded concrete evidence to sup-
port the government’s detention of American citizens, but low-
ered its evidentiary standards.173  The Supreme Court required 
that a prisoner have an opportunity to rebut the government’s al-
legations: “Any process in which the Executive’s factual asser-
tions go wholly unchallenged or are simply presumed correct 
without any opportunity for the alleged combatant to demon-
strate otherwise falls constitutionally short.”174 
The Court ruled that the Due Process Clause requires that 
detained citizens have an opportunity to present evidence chal-
 
 167 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld [Hamdi II], 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2636–37 (2004). 
 168 Id. at 2637. 
 169 Hamdi I, 316 F.3d at 463. 
 170 Id. at 473–74. 
 171 Id. at 470 (“[L]itigation cannot be the driving force in effectuating and recording 
wartime detentions.  The military has been charged . . . with winning a war, not prevail-
ing in a possible court case.”). 
 172 Id. at 474 (“Article III courts are ill-positioned to police the military’s distinction 
between those in the arena of combat who should be detained and those who should not.”). 
 173 Hamdi II, 124 S. Ct. at 2648, 2649 (“[A] citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his 
classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his clas-
sification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a 
neutral decisionmaker.”). 
 174 Id. at 2651. 
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lenging the government’s accusation of disloyalty.175  It refused to 
defer to the government’s evidence without reviewing its reason-
ableness.176 
Although the Court required the government to provide evi-
dence to support citizen detentions, it also gave the government 
significant power to prosecute the war by lowering evidentiary 
standards.177  The Court observed that a citizen’s due process 
rights must be weighed against the government’s interests in 
protecting national security secrets and preventing prisoners 
from returning to the battlefield.178  The Court ruled that lowered 
evidentiary requirements in court proceedings are constitutional: 
  Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reli-
able available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding.  
Likewise, the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in 
favor of the Government’s evidence, so long as that presumption re-
mained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were pro-
vided.179 
Furthermore, a prisoner can be tried by a military tribunal, 
as long as proper due process protections are implemented.180  
The Court also trusted lower federal courts to balance citizens’ 
constitutional rights with the military’s need to protect national 
security secrets.181  Despite its presumption in favor of the gov-
ernment’s evidence, the Court protected the foundation of due 
process: a person’s right to be heard by a neutral decision-maker 
and to rebut allegations made against him.182 
As the Court explained in Hamdi, a federal district court can 
implement procedures that protect both constitutional rights and 
 
 175 Id. at 2649.  “It is equally fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity 
to be heard ‘must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’  These 
essential constitutional promises may not be eroded.”  Id. (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 
U.S. 67 (1972)). 
 176 Hamdi II, 124  S. Ct. at 2650 (“[W]e necessarily reject the Government’s assertion 
that separation of powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts 
in such circumstances.”). 
 177 Id. at 2649. 
 178 Id. at 2647 (“We reaffirm today . . . a citizen’s right to be free from involuntary 
confinement . . . and we weigh the opposing governmental interests . . . . in ensuring that 
those who have in fact fought with the enemy during a war do not return to battle against 
the United States.”). 
 179 Id. at 2649. 
 180 Id. at 2651. 
 181 Id. at 2652 (“We have no reason to doubt that courts faced with these sensitive 
matters will pay proper heed both to the matters of national security that might arise in 
an individual case and to the constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties 
that remain vibrant even in times of security concerns.”). 
 182 Id. at 2648.  See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The funda-
mental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner.’”). 
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national security secrets.183  The Court reasoned that “arguments 
that military officers ought not have to wage war under the 
threat of litigation lose much of their steam when factual dis-
putes at enemy-combatant hearings are limited to the alleged 
combatant’s acts.”184   
As Professor John Yoo has observed, like surveillance courts, 
federal courts can modify judicial procedures to accommodate na-
tional security concerns.185  In 1978, Congress enacted the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which established For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Courts (FISC) composed of federal 
district court judges who can issue search warrants upon prob-
able cause that the government is targeting a foreign power.186  
Yoo explains that “FISA proceedings are held ex parte, with only 
the government represented, in a closed hearing so that classified 
information can be discussed with the judges while protecting in-
telligence sources and methods.”187  Like FISA proceedings, fed-
eral habeas courts can ensure that citizens’ due process rights 
are protected by a neutral decision-maker while also protecting 
national security secrets during wartime.188 
C. The Court’s Respect for the President’s Power 
Although the Supreme Court protected constitutional rights 
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, it also recognized the President’s power to 
defend national security.189  The Court reaffirmed the holding in 
Ex parte Quirin, which allows the President to detain enemy 
combatants during a war, even if the enemy combatant is an 
American citizen.190  In Ex parte Quirin, decided by the Court in 
1942 during World War II, eight Germans used submarines to 
reach the United States.191  They carried explosives and planned 
to destroy war facilities in the U.S. for the German govern-
ment.192  After they were captured, President Roosevelt signed a 
 
 183 Hamdi II, 124 S. Ct. at 2652 (“We have no reason to doubt that courts faced with 
these sensitive matters will pay proper heed both to the matters of national security that 
might arise in an individual case and to the constitutional limitations safeguarding essen-
tial liberties that remain vibrant even in times of security concerns.”). 
 184 Id. at 2649. 
 185 Yoo, supra note 52, at 442. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Hamdi II, 124 S. Ct. at 2652. 
 189 Id. at 2647 (“[O]ur Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of warmak-
ing belong in the hands of those who are best positioned and most politically accountable 
for making them.”). 
 190 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942) (“Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent 
does not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in 
violation of the law of war.”). 
 191 Id. at 21. 
 192 Id. 
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proclamation declaring that anybody attempting to enter the 
United States to commit war acts would be “subject to the law of 
war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals.”193  The cap-
tured individuals, one of whom claimed to be an American citi-
zen, challenged the President’s authority to establish military 
tribunals and argued that they had to be tried in civil courts by 
juries.194 
The Court in Quirin distinguished between lawful combat-
ants and unlawful combatants under the law of war.195  The main 
distinction between a lawful combatant and an unlawful combat-
ant is that the latter does not wear a uniform.196  Spies and ter-
rorists are commonly classified as unlawful combatants, i.e., 
“those who during time of war pass surreptitiously from enemy 
territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for 
the commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or 
property.”197 
The Court ruled that captured individuals who do not wear a 
uniform while aiding enemy forces are subject to military tribu-
nals, not civil courts.198  Furthermore, the Court declared that 
the citizenship of one of the prisoners did not entitle him to a 
civil trial by jury.199  It observed, “Citizenship in the United 
States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the con-
sequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in viola-
tion of the law of war.”200  The Court ruled that the President’s 
power to detain enemy combatants so that they do not return to 
the battlefield is an essential war power.201 
The Court’s opinion in Quirin modified but did not overturn 
the ruling in Ex parte Milligan that “[m]artial rule can never ex-
ist where the courts are open, and in the proper and unob-
structed exercise of their jurisdiction.”202  In Hamdi, the Court 
distinguished Quirin from Milligan by observing that in the lat-
ter case, the Court reasoned that Milligan was arrested at home 
as a resident of Indiana, not as a prisoner of war: 
 
 193 Id. at 22–23 (quoting Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 7, 1942)). 
 194 Id. at 24. 
 195 Id. at 30–31. 
 196 Id. at 31. 
 197 Id. at 35. 
 198 Id. at 31. 
 199 Id. at 31, 37. 
 200 Id. at 37. 
 201 Id. at 28–29 (“An important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of meas-
ures by the military command not only to repel and defeat the enemy, but to seize and 
subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede 
our military effort have violated the law of war.”). 
 202 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 127 (1866). 
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Had Milligan been captured while he was assisting Confed-
erate soldiers by carrying a rifle against Union troops on a Con-
federate battlefield, the holding of the Court might well have 
been different.  The Court’s repeated explanations that Milligan 
was not a prisoner of war suggest that had these different cir-
cumstances been present he could have been detained under 
military authority for the duration of the conflict, whether or not 
he was a citizen.203 
The Court in Hamdi showed that judicial review and mili-
tary operations can function together.204  Once a captured pris-
oner is found to be an American citizen, he must be provided with 
the due process rights detailed in Hamdi before a neutral deci-
sion-maker.205  However, if the tribunal confirms that the citizen 
is indeed an enemy combatant, he may be detained for the dura-
tion of the war.206  The Court in Hamdi provided strong protec-
tion both for constitutional rights and for national security, prov-
ing that they are not mutually exclusive objectives.207 
CONCLUSION 
As evidenced by the World War II cases of Korematsu v. 
United States208 and Hirabayashi v. United States,209 the Su-
preme Court has historically refrained from challenging the 
President’s wartime actions.210  Using the deferential balancing 
model, the Court in Korematsu deferred to the President’s consti-
tutional interpretation to allow presidential actions that it would 
normally find unconstitutional.211  Similarly, in Hirabayashi, the 
 
 203 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124  S. Ct. 2633, 2642 (2004). 
 204 Id. at 2649–50. 
 205 Id. at 2648. 
 206 Id. at 2641, 2642. 
 207 Id. at 2647 (“We reaffirm today the fundamental nature of a citizen’s right to be 
free from involuntary confinement by his own government without due process of law, and 
we weigh the opposing governmental interests against the curtailment of liberty that such 
confinement entails.”). 
 208 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 209 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 210 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (“[W]e cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the 
military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, 
whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained.”).   
Where, as they did here, the conditions call for the exercise of judgment and 
discretion and for the choice of means by those branches of the Government on 
which the Constitution has placed the responsibility of war-making, it is not 
for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute its 
judgment for theirs. 
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93. 
 211 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219–20.  
Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes, except un-
der circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic 
governmental institutions.  But when under conditions of modern warfare our 
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Court did not challenge the internment order against Japanese-
Americans.212  Instead, the Court used the justiciability doctrines 
model to avoid hearing the merits of the internment order en-
tirely.213 
The Supreme Court should reject both the deferential bal-
ancing model and the justiciability doctrines model because they 
are inconsistent with the Founding Fathers’ belief in constitu-
tional absolutism.214  The Founders felt that the President and 
Congress could not alter the Constitution’s provisions even dur-
ing wartime.215  They expected the Supreme Court to recognize 
its constitutionally-mandated duty to protect citizens’ constitu-
tional rights from oppressive governmental actions.216  Although 
the constitutional absolutism model is most consistent with the 
Founders’ wishes, the Court has applied the model in ways con-
trary to their beliefs by overly restricting presidential power dur-
ing wartime,217 instead of ensuring that the President had suffi-
cient power to defend the country against foreign attacks.218 
The balancing test with bite model advocated in this com-
ment is most consistent with the Founding Fathers’ views be-
cause it provides all three branches with important wartime 
roles.219  In applying the balancing test with bite model, the 
 
shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commen-
surate with the threatened danger. 
Id.  
 212 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85.  
Since the sentences of three months each imposed by the district court on the 
two counts were ordered to run concurrently, it will be unnecessary to consider 
questions raised with respect to the first count [for violating the internment 
order] if we find that the conviction on the second count, for violation of the 
curfew order, must be sustained. 
Id.  
 213 Id. 
 214 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 470 (“Until the 
people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the established 
form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no presump-
tion, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a depar-
ture from it prior to such an act.”). 
 215 Id. at 469.  
[Y]et it is not to be inferred . . . that the representatives of the people, when-
ever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of their con-
stituents incompatible with the provisions in the existing Constitution would, 
on that account, be justifiable in a violation of those provisions . . . . 
Id.  
 216 Id. at 469 (“[T]he courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited 
Constitution against legislative encroachments . . . .”). 
 217 See, e.g., Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 151 (1861). 
 218 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 423 (“Energy in 
the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.  It is essential to 
the protection of the community against foreign attacks . . . .”). 
 219 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (“Whatever power the United States 
Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with en-
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Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld recognized its duty to determine 
whether the President’s actions are constitutional.220  The Court 
also required the President to provide concrete evidence to sup-
port a citizen’s detention,221 but lowered the military’s eviden-
tiary standard during wartime.222  Finally, the Court granted the 
President extensive wartime power by reaffirming the holding in 
Ex parte Quirin, which allows the President to detain even 
American citizens designated as enemy combatants.223 
The Court in Hamdi showed that courts can have vigorous 
roles in protecting citizens’ rights during wartime.224  It seems 
that the Court learned from the World War II cases that failing 
to review presidential wartime actions can lead to tragic abuses 
of citizens’ constitutional rights.225  During wars, the Court must 
delicately balance the competing interests of protecting constitu-
tional rights and allowing the President sufficient power to pro-
tect national security.226  However, it is essential to the system of 
 
emy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three 
branches when individual liberties are at stake.”). 
 220 Id. (“We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the 
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”). 
 221 See id. at 537 (“Any process in which the Executive’s factual assertions go wholly 
unchallenged or are simply presumed correct without any opportunity for the alleged 
combatant to demonstrate otherwise falls constitutionally short.”). 
 222 Id. at 533 (“[E]nemy-combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their un-
common potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.”). 
 223 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942) (“Citizenship in the United States of an en-
emy belligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is 
unlawful because in violation of the law of war.”). 
 224 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535 (“[I]t does not infringe on the core role of the military for 
the courts to exercise their own time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of re-
viewing and resolving claims like those presented here.”). 
 225 The Court cites Justice Murphy’s dissenting opinion in Korematsu v. United 
States, where he argued that the Court should examine the reasonableness of military 
policies that impact citizens’ constitutional rights.  Id.  See also Mark Tushnet, Defending 
Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273 (2003).  
Tushnet argues that courts, along with the rest of society, undergo a process of social 
learning.  Tushnet explains the process as follows: 
The government takes some action that its officials—and, frequently, the 
courts—justify by invoking national security.  In retrospect, once the wartime 
emergency has passed, the actions, and their endorsement by the courts, come 
to be seen as unjustified in fact (that is, by the facts as they actually existed 
when the actions were taken). . . . The social learning is this: Knowing that 
government officials in the past have in fact exaggerated threats to national 
security or have taken actions that were ineffective with respect to the threats 
that actually were present, we have become increasingly skeptical about con-
temporary claims regarding those threats, with the effect that the scope of pro-
posed government responses to threats has decreased. 
Id. at 283–84. 
 226 See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.  
  [A] citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy 
combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a 
fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral 
decisionmaker. . . .  At the same time, the exigencies of the circumstances may 
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checks and balances underlying the American government that 
the Court take a significant role in protecting citizens’ rights. 
 
demand that, aside from these core elements, enemy-combatant proceedings 
may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive 
at a time of ongoing military conflict. 
Id.  
